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Environmental Standards Within NAFTA:
Difference by Design and the Retreat from
Harmonization
JEFFERY ATIK*
Professor Atik argues that NAFTA, in legitimating regulatory
differences among the NAFTA parties, represents a repudiation of
standard harmonization. He states that while NAFTA and its
environmental side agreement "have been described as the 'greenest'
trade agreement to date," it marks a significant retreatfrom efforts to
harmonize global environmental standards. This rejection is a
product of "ajealous retention of sovereignty" by the NAFTA parties,
as well as the careful maintenance of the parties' distinct production
roles and specialities. Thus, Professor Atik argues that a convergence
of standards will likely remain elusive within NAFTA. Both high-
standard and low-standard parties may prefer the maintenance of
differentials. While there may be efficiency gains from non-
harmonized standards, other interests, including environmental
quality, may well be compromised Institutions charged with
enforcement will further legitimate differentiated environmental
standards. Professor Atik states that at least for the time being,
Mexico will be able to maintain lower environmental standards than
either Canada or the United States and Mexico. He does conclude,
however, that despite NAFTA's maintenance of divergent standards,
the agreement does allow for the joint determination of environmental
standards, and institutions established by NAFTA are available to
both monitor and adjust standards (especially Mexico's) to
appropriate levels. Clearly, as Professor Atik points out, NAFTA
represents a "new experiment in regional organization, "which may
result in a "cleaner" United States, but leaves Mexico's
environmental fate in greater doubt.
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University (Boston). Frederick Abbott, Alfred C. Aman, Jr., and Joel
Trachtman provided helpful criticism. I am most grateful to Suffolk law librarians Sonia Ensins and Susan
Sweetgall and to research assistant Lusiella Fa~zino.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although NAFTA' and the NAFTA environmental side agreement
(Environmental Side Agreement)2 have been described as the "greenest" trade
agreements to date,3 neither calls for any particular level of environmental
quality4 nor sets any environmental standards.' Indeed, these accords signal
a retreat from regional and global efforts to cause standards to converge,
rejecting harmonization." Instead, NAFTA and the Environmental Side
Agreement provide that each party will maintain its respective national
standards in the area of the environment.7
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) &
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
2. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 9-14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement].
3. James E. Bailey, Free Trade and the Environment-Can NAFTA Reconcile the Irreconcilable?,
8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 839 (1993). According to Bush Administration EPA chief William Reilly,
NAFTA is "the most environmentally sensitive, the greenest free trade agreement ever negotiated
anywhere." Id. at 839.
4. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483. The Environmental Side
Agreement does call for "high levels of environmental protection," but it neither defines "high levels" nor
sets any standards. Id
5. See Frederick M. Abbott, The NAFTA Environmental Dispute Settlement System as Prototype for
Regional Integration Arrangements, 4 Y.B. INT'L ENVrL. L. 3 (1993); J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A New Model for International Collaboration
on Trade and the Environment, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273 (1994).
6. According to NAFrA, supra note I, art. 906(2), 32 I.L.M. at 387, "mTlhe Parties shall to the
greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective standards-related measures, so as to facilitate
trade in a good or service between the Parties." This call to harmonization, however, is "without prejudice
to the rights of any Party .... " Id. In other words, harmonization is subject to each party's unilateral right
to establish standards. Furthermore, this reference to harmonization applies to product standards only; there
is no reference to harmonizing process or production standards, where most environmental regulation lies.
Many observers feel that NAFTA will eventually embrace harmonization. See, e.g., Abbott, supra
note 5.
7. Eeach party's right to set standards is set forth within the standards-related measures chapter of
NAFTA:
Article 904: Basic Rights and Obligations
Right to Take Standards-Related Measures
I. Each Party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, maintain or apply any
standard-related measure, including any such measure relating to safety, the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, and any measure to ensure its
enforcement or implementation ....
Right to Establish Level of Protection
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, each Party may, in pursuing its
legitimate objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the
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The existence of markedly different environmental standards among the
NAFTA parties raises alarms in both the trade and environmental
communities. NAFTA constitutes a significant departure from earlier regional
groupings, such as the European Union, in that it supports sharply diverging
production conditions within its territory. NAFTA will create a single, fairly
well-unified consumer market, while maintaining three distinct production
environments. The maintenance of different environmental standards by
Mexico, Canada, and the United States is more than a jealous retention of
sovereignty by each of these nations; standards are an important part of the
implicit specialization of production that is fundamental to NAFTA's design.
This structure of economic specialization may not be apparent on a facial
review of the NAFTA instruments. NAFTA avoids creating special rights and
speaks neutrally of generic "Parties." NAFTA is formally reciprocal in its
obligations The reality of NAFTA, however, is one of U.S. economic
dominance.9
NAFTA represents more than a failure of nerve on the course to regional
integration. Rather it links three economies along neo-mercantilist lines,
where resources (including labor) are drawn from economic satellites but are
generally commanded by the center. This organization has a strong spatial
aspect. Given the diverging structure of the three national economies, as well
as regulatory differentials, heavy industrial production will be placed largely
outside the United States. In a manner reminiscent of so many U.S. towns,
"dirty" activities will be located across the NAFTA tracks.
environment or consumers, establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate in
accordance with [provisions concerning risk assessment].
NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. at 387.
Article 3 of the Environmental Side Agreement also recognizes the right of each NAFTA party to
establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and to adopt its own environmental laws and
regulations. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
Furthermore, the Environmental Side Agreement provides that "[niothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities in the
territory of another Party." Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, art. 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1494. Thus,
non-interference is an expected NAFTA norm.
8. There are instances of departure from neutral treatment in the NAFTA structure. For example,
Canada may not be subjected to trade sanctions under the Environmental Side Agreement for "persistent
failure" to enforce its environmental laws. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, annex 41(5), 32
I.L.M. at 1498. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the
NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1 (1994).
9. Although Germany is often said to dominate the European Union, its economy is dwarfed by the
combined economies of the other European Union (EU) member states. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 25-26 (2d ed. 1995).
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The NAFTA parties are seen as having distinctive roles. According to the
prevailing caricature, Canada is to be a provider of natural resources; the
United States is to be the locus for product development and centralized
management; and Mexico is to be a substitute for other newly industrialized
country (NIC) export platforms as the source for high-labor-content industrial
goods. These assignments are not spelled out, yet it is hard to imagine how
any one of the NAFTA parties could develop into a different economic
identity. The United States will remain the dominating center, the focus of the
principal binary relationships for both Mexico and Canada. As such, Mexico
and Canada must occupy economic niches ceded by the United States in order
to secure a share of NAFTA's economic benefits.
I. A RETREAT FROM HARMONIZATION
A. Designing Difference within NAFTA
Harmonization of standards is an enormously powerful and effective
technique, and has played a key role in regional integration and in the
construction of the world trading system. Harmonization permits formal
regulatory authority to remain devolved at the national or subnational level,
while providing consistent rules throughout a broader trading area. Through
harmonization, regional or international economic disciplines are translated to
national laws and regulations; harmonizing measures cause differing national
standards to converge. Harmonization can be applied to product standards,
permitting goods to trade across borders, and can be exerted on process
standards, such as labor and environmental regulation, under which goods and
services are produced.'
In Europe, harmonization has been the central legislative tool used to
create a common internal market." The convergence of standards provided by
harmonization has been essential to the European project of economic
10. See John J. Barcel6 III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment - the GA 77 and the
Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 756-57 (1994); Richard
B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042-45
(1993).
11. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3(h), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 16 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (setting out as a primary activity of the Community "the
approximation [of the laws of Member States] to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common
Market.")
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integration. 2 Both product and process standards have been harmonized, as
the European economy has been restructured to more rationally distribute
production.
NAFTA represents a sharp break from the European experience. 3
Whereas the European Community treaty calls for "approximation" of member
state laws and regulations generally 4 in order to bring about the "ever closer
Union,"'5 NAFTA institutionalizes sharp regulatory gradients, repudiating
among other things, any pretense of universal harmonization. 6
NAFTA is designed to distribute industrial production among three
countries with strikingly different production conditions; it does not seek to
equalize production conditions. Recognizing this, one might wonder if
NAFTA represents economic integration as that term is commonly understood.
Indeed, establishing a single production market (as opposed to a single
consumer market) may not be one of NAFTA's goals.1"
Distinctive production conditions are of course a source of gains-of-trade
and are arguably desirable."8 To a large extent, distinctive production
conditions cannot be avoided; they may reflect differences in fundamental
national endowments. Canada may possess a relative natural advantage in the
production of timber that would overwhelm any regulatory barrier placed by
another NAFTA party. 9
For many goods and services, however, these differences are more
artificial than, say, Costa Rica's "natural" advantage for producing bananas,
12. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW 428-
65 (1993) [hereinafter BERMANN ET AL., EC LAW].
13. For an institutional comparison of the European Union and NAFTA, see generally Frederick M.
Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the
GA7T Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917 (1992).
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 2, 3(h), 298 U.N.T.S. at 100.
15. Id pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14.
16. Harmonization in specific sectors, such as intellectual property rights, has been embraced within
NAFTA.
17. See Abbott, supra note 5 at 28-29; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the
Environment: The Evolution of Legal Regimes, 68 CHI-KENT L. REv. 173, 175-76 (1993).
18. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Fair Trade, Reciprocity, and Harmonization: The New Challenge to the
Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM 547 (Alan V. Deardorff& Robert M. Stem eds. 1994).
19. In fact, the United States and Canada have maintained a longstanding dispute over Canadian
exports of timber to the United States. See, e.g., Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel No. USA-92-1904-02, May 6, 1993;
Panel No. USA-92-1904-01, Dec. 17, 1993.
1995]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
or California's for oranges. ° If the key to NAFTA is difference, and not
uniformity, or even the approximation, of production conditions, then it is no
surprise that harmonization and regulatory convergence will play a lesser role.
NAFTA fails to remove existing restrictions limiting cross-border
movement of important categories of factors of production. These artificial
barriers will lead to markedly different production environments in each of the
three NAFTA parties." NAFTA's embrace of differentiated production
conditions is clearly apparent in its treatment of labor. NAFTA permits each
party to maintain national labor standards.2 Critics of NAFTA have often
pointed out the negative impact of lower Mexican labor standards within the
NAFTA structure. These objections have focused on health and safety
standards, rights to organize, lower minimum wages, and other aspects of the
employment relationship. 3
The most salient feature of NAFTA's labor policy, however, is the use of
strict migration controls in order to perpetuate the existence of three distinct
labor markets: one Mexican, one Canadian, and one of the United States. 4
This solution is wildly different from the European model, where the free
movement of workers has been a cornerstone principle." Even if labor
standards were harmonized within NAFTA, labor costs likely would not
equalize given the maintenance of border controls.
NAFTA also permits significant limitations on the movement of capital,26
another important factor of production.27 There is no talk of a common
20. But California's comparative advantage for oranges is arguably artificial, as it results from
enormous irrigation projects, a regulatory artifact with important ecological and trade implications.
21. See Ileana Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and Environment: NAFTA,
Competitiveness, and the Pursuit of Environmental Welfare Objectives, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65
(1995).
22. NAFTA, supra note 1. See also North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
23. See Taylor, supra note 8, at 79-84.
24. NAFTA permits movement only to a restricted category of workers, and then only on a temporary
basis. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 16, 32 1.L.M. at 663.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 48, 49. See also BERMANN ET AL., EC LAW, supra note 12, at
466-517.
26. NAFTA Article 2104 generally permits a Party to restrict capital transfers where a Party
experiences serious balance-of-payment difficulties. NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 1.L.M. at 700-01. But see
Taylor, supra note 8, at 73.
27. Note again the contrast with the European Union, where the free movement of capital is assured.
See EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 73, 298 U.N.T.S. at 44; See also BERMANN ET AL., EC LAW, supra note
12, at 617. Investment controls were abolished by the Right of Establishment. EEC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 52, 298 U.N.T.S. at 37-38. See also BERMANN ETAL., EC LAW at 543-49. Exchange controls on passive
investment have been eliminated in recent years. Id. at 615-17.
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NAFTA currency, be it the U.S. dollar or otherwise. Indeed, the current
Mexican financial crisis, and the reluctance of the U.S. Congress to support
monetary intervention, demonstrate the extent of Mexico's dependence on its
own limited financial resources.28 NAFTA permits Mexico and Canada to
maintain investment controls,29 further demarcating the separateness of
production environments.
The treatment of environmental regulation under NAFTA and the
Environmental Side Agreement confirms this analysis.30 Harmonization of
environmental standards is unequivocally rejected. The Environmental Side
Agreement recognizes "the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies
and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and
regulations. ... ""
B. Convergence of Environmental Standards
Convergence to harmonized environmental standards may or may not be
beneficial from the view of an affected nation, depending in part on the policy
involved and in part on the direction of convergence. To the extent a nation
can identify an efficient internal level of environmental regulation, that nation
can be expected to resist any forced movement away from that level in order
to converge with harmonized standards.32
Consider air pollution.33 Unsurprisingly, the United States and Mexico
have vastly different notions about the appropriate level of factory emissions.
28. See Clay Chandler, Recession in Mexico Called Likely if Rescue Plan Fails, WASH. POST, Jan.
31, 1995, at D1.
29. For a discussion of NAFTA's treatment of national controls on foreign direct investment, see
Jeffery Atik, Fairness and Managed Foreign Direct Investment, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17-23
(1994).
30. See Daniel Magraw & Steve Chamovitz, NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade Possible?,
ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1994, at 260.
31. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
32. Some environmentalists would argue that, due to the inordinate influence of producing firms in
political systems, standards are systematically low in all jurisdictions. For a discussion of political failure,
see DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATF: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FuTURE 73-77 (1994).
Enlightened political leaders would embrace external requirements which raise domestic standards to
more appropriate levels.
33. Air pollution is an interesting example because different standards are tolerated even within the
United States. See Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 50 (1995)
(citing Alexander K. Wang, Southern California's Quest for Clean Air: Is EPA's Dilemma Nearing an
End?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1137(1994)).
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In part these differences might arise from the differing abilities of the U.S. and
Mexican environments to absorb marginal emission.34 In part, however, these
standards reflect very different social cost assessments. This is of course the
pre-NAFTA and current condition.
If an optimal level of sulfur dioxide emissions exists in a nation, for
example, both upward and downward movement away from this optimum are
costly. While certain environmental sympathizers might resist the notion,
environmental standards can be set so high that the marginal benefits to the
environment do not justify the additional expense to society. On the other
hand, converging moves by other countries towards a nation's optimal
environmental standards are usually welcome. The United States would derive
several types of benefits from rising environmental standards in Mexico. First,
given the inevitable transboundary effects, the U.S. environment would benefit
from reduced environmental stresses. 5 Second, U.S. standards would be
liberated from the undercutting effect of the presence of less-costly Mexican
products.
The country that moves away from its natural regulatory level is in some
sense transferring wealth to its counterparts. The country's diminished
environment (resulting from downward moves) or its excessive compliance
costs (resulting from upward moves) may or may not be made up by benefits
realized in the counterpart economy; these may be net loss games. The fixing
of harmonized environmental standards within a region, despite its technical
aspect, and even when mediated through supranational institutions, is an
instance of international redistribution; it is also an exercise of national power.
This being understood, one can ask who gains and who loses by converging
environmental standards within NAFTA, and by how much?
Individual nations may feel ambivalent about particular harmonization
initiatives, depending in part on whether the direction of convergence is
towards or away from their optimal internal levels. Consideration of the entire
globe, or a region within it such as North America, may suggest an appropriate
overall direction for harmonization movements of the constituent nations.36
The global or regional optimal common standard may serve as a convergence
34. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 2052-53.
35. But the U.S. environment could suffer if industrial production previously located in Mexico is
displaced by the imposition of higher Mexican standards and is shifted to the United States.
36. Low standards may result from a prisoners' dilemma. Unless all (or nearly all) nations cooperate
to reduce CFC emissions, for example, no country gains from reducing its emissions.
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target for each jurisdiction." If, for example, global welfare is enhanced by
controlling greenhouse gasses, then upward harmonization is a fairly clear
policy choice for each jurisdiction.
Environmentalists are likely to view convergence favorably where
environmental quality standards across many nations are improving. Of
course, an optimal common standard for a region such as NAFTA is likely to
depart from the optimal national standard for either Canada, Mexico, or the
United States.3" Furthermore, the efficient common regional standard may
well be a middle ground, suggesting a mix of upward and downward
convergence by the various constituent countries. Of course, legitimization of
downward moves is alarming for anyone who believes environmental concerns
are systematically undervalued in national and regional politics. The notion
of optimal environmental standards is itself controversial;39 it is dependent on
many factors, including a nation's or region's level of development.
NAFTA signifies a missed opportunity for an immediate upward
convergence of environmental standards. Raising North American standards
now would have limited negative consequences from an environmental
perspective for Mexico, and, given transborder effects, would improve
environmental quality throughout the region. However, higher harmonized
standards would impose costs, which the NAFTA parties were unwilling or
unable to pay.'
C. Harmonization within Trade Agreements
From a free trade point of view, however, all movement towards
convergence of standards is positive,4 ' whatever its direction (upward or
downward) and without respect to which country makes the move. The
37. Note that in many cases, common standards are inefficient. See ESTY, supra note 32, at 173.
Pesticides are an example where different growing conditions and consumption patterns suggest differing
tolerances are appropriate. Id at 175. See also Bartlett P. Miller, The Effect of the GATTand the NAFTA
on Pesticide Regulation: A Hard Look at Harmonization, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 201, 202
(1995) (arguing NAFTA's diverging standards are a better solution than harmonization).
38. An optimal regional standard can be achieved through a mix of different local standards, some
dirtier and some cleaner. Market solutions are likely to generate mixed responses.
39. By this view, fixing standards is a technical process, not a political one.
40. Some funds have been dedicated to environmental clean-up and infrastructure, mainly in the U.S.-
Mexico border area. See Lawrence J. Rowe, Note, NAFTA, the Border Area Environmental Program, and
Mexico's Border Area: Prescription for Sustainable Development?, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 197,
214(1995).
41. See EsTY, supra note, 32, at 172-74.
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elimination of regulatory gradients continues to be the primary seduction of
harmonization.42 Harmonization presumes a hierarchy of values, in which
trade interests enjoy an enhanced and, at times overweening, status.
Additionally, harmonization can operate within a regional organization
to promote solidarity and interdependence. Common standards enhance a
common political identity. By asking what is the appropriate "European" or
"North American" standard, political actors move away from narrow
parochialism and disabling national identities. Harmonization represents a
threat to notions of self-determination and legitimacy where national identities
remain important.
Harmonization appears in two distinctive forms in international trading
regimes. The first and milder of these, which I will term "Accorded
Harmonization," results when nations jointly adopt consistent standards. The
resulting harmonized standards are not necessarily uniform; the relevant test
is whether differing national standards operate to distort trade. Accorded
Harmonization, the legislative technique-of-choice during the early
development of European Union law, through which laws of member states
were "approximated," '43 remains a long-run possibility under NAFTA."
Accorded Harmonization requires each nation to agree to accept the changes
in its respective internal order. National sensibilities and national preferences
are always respected, at least nominally. When agreement fails, or when
concessions are not yielded, Accorded Harmonization grinds to a halt and
progressive convergence is stymied.
Harmonization was transformed during the 1970s and 1980s by the rise of
so-called non-tariff barriers (NTBs): complex, newly-enacted national laws
and regulations, often concerning worker safety, consumer protection and the
environment.45 A new form of harmonization evolved in response to NTBs,
which I will call "Coercive Harmonization," and is well-illustrated by Cassis
42. According to Daniel Esty, "Where standards are harmonized, the scope for conflict is markedly
reduced. Indeed, internationally accepted standards greatly facilitate multilateral cooperation in general and
enhance commercial interaction in particular." Id. at 108. The free trade view of convergence is not the
same as the view of particular producers; producers prefer regulatory advantages just as they prefer to
externalize their costs.
43. The framers of the European Community developed the "directive," a form of Community
legislation addressed to member states requiring implementation in respective national legal systems. Under
former EEC Treaty article 100 (before amendment by the Single European Act), many harmonizing
directives required the unanimous vote of the Council. Thus, legislative harmonization could not be
imposed against the will of any member state. BERMANN ET AL., EC LAW, supra note 12, at 428-31.
44. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1.
45. See, e.g., BERMANN ETAL., EC LAW, supra note 12, at 429.
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de Dijon.' Under Coercive Harmonization, approximation of standards is
carried out over the objection of the nation maintaining the standard, often by
effectively substituting the standard of the nation making the challenge. 7
In the cause of eliminating trade barriers, enormous pressures are placed
on political units to demonstrate that the social benefits which arise from their
particular laws, regulations, and practices outweigh their negative impact on
trade. This test has come to be known as the Principle of Proportionality:
policy justifications are balanced against their trade costs, and are upheld only
if: (i) benefits exceed costs and (ii) the adopted measure is the least restrictive
alternative with respect to trade for an equivalent benefit. Thus, in Cassis de
Dion, German consumer protection standards which prohibited the sale of the
French liqueur were struck down. Labeling would have been a less restrictive
means of protecting German consumers.48
Coercive Harmonization reflects a deep skepticism about all laws and
standards which happen to be distinctive; it sees parochialism, if not
protectionism, everywhere. Thus, the German Beer Purity Law, in place for
hundreds of years, was swept away by higher EU values.49 Similarly, Canada
used Coercive Harmonization in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to attack Puerto Rico's regulation of UHT Milk. 0 And, most
famously, Mexico challenged the U.S. "dolphin safe" tuna import restrictions51
imposed by the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 2
Two parallel notions of distortion are embedded in Coercive
Harmonization. The first is the trade distortion created by the presence of a
national standard. By impeding trade, NTBs move economic activity away
46. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon),
1979 E.C.R. 649. See also the discussion in BERMANN ET AL., EC LAW, supra note 12, at 356-58; ESTY,
supra note 32, at 262.
47. This is known as the doctrine of mutual recognition in European Union jurisprudence.
48. EsTy, supra note 32, at 262.
49. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany (German beer), 1987 E.C.R. 1227. See the discussion in
Christopher J. lamarino, Technical Barriers to Trade Under the NAFTA System: A Call for Legitimate
Protection, 21 J. LEGIS. 111, 118-20 (1995).
50. In the Matter of Puerto Rico Regulations in the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T Milk from
Quebec, U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel No. USA-93-1807-01 (June 3,
1993). See the discussion in David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade
Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 847-48 (1994); ESTY, supra note 32, at 273-74; lamarino, supra
note 49, at 116-18.
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin], see the
discussion in EsTy, supra note 32, at 268-69.
52. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1973).
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from those countries possessing "comparative advantage," depriving foreign
producers of markets and consumers of more favorable prices. Second, the
establishment of NTBs evidences political failure within the countries
imposing them. Here the story is one of capture of political institutions by
local producers pursuing protectionist agenda.53 Free trade predicts that the
aggregate social benefit of open markets exceeds the negative impact on local
producers.54 By exploiting collective action advantages, interested domestic
producers "purchase" NTBs from political institutions and frustrate the
realization of a superior social result." From this view, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act protects the U.S. fishing industry far more than it protects
dolphins.56
NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement have evoked considerable
pessimism and alarm in the environmental advocacy community. In part,
environmentalists fear the values of the free-trade juggernaut. It is hard to
imagine giving greater offense to environmentalists than by labeling hard-
fought environmental gains, such as the Marine Mammal Protection Act, as
mere non-tariff barriers and dismiss them as such.
In part, this fear of NAFTA was a fear of the potential reach of
harmonization within the North American triad." Accorded Harmonization
threatens U.S. environmental standards, since the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) and other trade advocates might bargain away environmental quality
in exchange for other goals. Accorded Harmonization, involving resource-
poor Mexico, would inevitably be downward for the United States. 8 Still
more frightening was the prospect of an expanded use of Coercive
Harmonization by Mexican and Canadian exporters to strike down U.S.
environmental laws as disguised restraints on trade.59 This precise specter had
already arisen within U.S.-Mexican economic relations in Tuna-Dolphin.
53. Notions of political failure are pushed two ways. Exporters see domestic producer dominance
leading to protective standards; environmentalists see producer dominance generating lax or non-existant
standards.
54. See JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 15 (3d ed. 1995).
55. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 2054.
56. This was the suspicion of the GATT panel in Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 51.
57. Magraw & Charnovitz, supra note 30. See also ESTY, supra note 32, at 27-28.
58. According to Jerry Brown, NAFTA will cause, "a slide to the bottom in terms of wage levels and
environmental standards as the United States links itself to Mexico, where ... environmental laws are
unenforced and unions remain captive to the state and to a political system profoundly different from our
own." Jerry Brown, Is NAFTA a Chance for US. to Trade Up or Down? For Workers, Environment?
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 1993.
59. See Taylor, supra note 8, at 105.
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While Accorded Harmonization of standards remains more of a long-term
possibility, nothing in these agreements provides for immediate harmonization
of anything in the environmental area, and it is not clear when, or if,
environmental harmonization negotiations might proceed. This contrasts
strikingly with NAFTA's approach in the intellectual property area, in which
harmonization was used to require significant Mexican reforms, lifting
Mexico's intellectual property law to "higher" U.S. and Canadian standards.'
Moreover, NAFTA erects strong bulwarks against Coercive Harmonization.
NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement provide that each party may
maintain its respective national standards as a continuing proposition and grant
substantial immunity to these standards from trade-restraint challenge.
III. HIGH STANDARDS/Low STANDARDS
NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement establish a regional
economic bloc that will have significant environmental protection gradients
within it. This decision is a matter of no small environmental concern; the
current status of the U.S.-Mexican border area has been described as
"appalling"'" and as a "cesspool. ' 62 The environmental advocacy community
would prefer that Mexico and the rest of North America be cleaned up, and
that future degradation be avoided through a high level of environmental
protection.
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement calls for each NAFTA party
to "provide for high levels of environmental protection." '63 It is not necessarily
clear what a high level of environmental protection entails; absent
harmonization, the notion of high environmental standards is intrinsically a
relative one. Operating within NAFTA today, high standards, understood to
be those prevalent within the United States and Canada, define low standards,
which in NAFTA almost certainly refers to Mexico. Relativity exclusively
60. NAFTA Article 1701(2) requires each Party to provide effective protection of intellectual property
rights by giving effect, at a minimum, to the standards contained in the Geneva, Berne, Paris, and UPOV
Conventions. NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. at 671.
61. Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement
to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 593, 594 (1993). "Simply put,
virtually every medium (water, land and air) in the border region has been in someway significantly
degraded by unfettered growth. The region's surface waters are veritable sewers, thick with human feces
and industrial toxins." Id. at 595.
62. Michael Robins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of Free Trade and
the Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 129 (1993).
63. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
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localizes environmental concerns to Mexico and so avoids the broader regional
challenge.
If "high levels" are read to be levels currently found within NAFTA (i.e.
Canada and United States), then eventual convergence must be upward and
should be undertaken almost completely by Mexico. Once convergence is
achieved, there would no longer remain any "high levels," or low levels for
that matter, within North America. Alternatively, high levels might refer to
levels existing outside of NAFTA, in which case there is a call for continuous
adjustment of environmental protection levels according to shifting norms.
Given NAFTA's preference for difference, the move to higher standards
may not necessarily involve convergence. Mexican standards may move to
higher "appropriate levels of protection,"' but never reach those in effect in
the United States and Canada. Nor should we presume that U.S. standards are
necessarily higher; an examination of certain environmental measures (such
as energy consumed per capita) may reveal the tolerance of appallingly low
"standards" within the United States.
Free trade orthodoxy comprehends environmental standards as yet another
type of production standard that is reflected in the cost of a particular good.
Particular environmental standards are neither good nor bad (free trade does
not prescribe this, despite what some of its critics assert) so long as they are
harmonized at some level. The social costs of pollution are not generally
avoided by an economy through the operation of lower environmental
standards; rather they are simply evaded by producing firms through shifting
their burdens onto others. To the extent that it suffers environmental damage,
Mexico has and will continue to "pay" for its lower standards, even if Mexican
producers benefit from laxity. Of course, the evasion of costs by producer-
firms does affect production decisions.
The problem from the free trade point of view results from differences in
standards, not from the standards themselves. Harmonization of
environmental standards, at high or low levels of protection, is the free trade
prescription, through which trade distortions may be minimized." A problem
for free trade exists in countries having markedly different environmental
standards that affect production decisions.' While low standards in Mexico
64. For example, NAFTA Article 712(5) calls for a Party to apply sanitary and phytosanitary
standards "only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate level of protection, taking into account
technical and economic feasibility." NAFTA, supra note I, 32 I.L.M. at 378.
65. EsTY, supra note 32, at 108.
66. Id. at 173-74.
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may permit Mexican producers to produce goods more cheaply than their U.S.
and Canadian counterparts, the costs of such pollution are largely internalized
within Mexico. Analytically, low standards resemble a subsidy.67 However,
under current international trade norms, generally available benefits provided
by a state are permitted." By tolerating stark differences in environmental
standards, as NAFTA does, significant political tensions are created.
From a free trade perspective, "high standards" are subject to attack from
below, based on the notion that they constitute a trade distortion. NAFTA
creates several grounds by which environmental standards may be challenged.
The National Treatment provision,' the provision on import and export
restrictions,7' and the Nullification and Impairment provision" are potential
instruments for Coercive Harmonization. Using these, Mexico could attack
U.S. domestic regulations as constituting forbidden trade barriers.
NAFTA provides certain standards with important, though limited,
immunity from this kind of challenge. First, NAFTA carves out a special
category of protected standards: those falling under the rubric of sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures.7" Each NAFTA party may adopt any SPS
measure "necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health
in its territory, including a measure more stringent than an international
standard, guideline or recommendation."' So long as an SPS measure has a
scientific basis, it cannot be attacked for violating NAFTA's National
Treatment provision or as constituting an import or export restriction.74
Furthermore, each NAFTA party may "establish its appropriate levels of
protection."75 These immunities, however, are not absolute; indeed they are
significantly undercut by remaining provisions on SPS measures which re-
introduce the possibility of a free trade-driven challenge. NAFTA requires
that SPS measures be "applied only to the extent necessary to achieve [the
party's] appropriate level of protection."'76 NAFTA further provides that "[n]o
Party may adopt, maintain or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure with
67. These are so-called "brown" subsidies. Id. at 169. Direct funding-called "green" subsidies-may
violate both GATT and the polluter-pays principle. See id. at 169-71.
68. See Barcel6, supra note 10, at 759-61.
69. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 301.
70. Id art. 309.
71. Id. annex 2004.
72. Id. art. 709, 32 I.L.M. at 377. See Wirth, supra note 49, at 830-3 1.
73. Id. art. 712(1), 32 I.L.M. at 377.
74. Id. art. 712(3), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
75. Id art. 712(2), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
76. Id art. 712(5), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
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a view to, or with the effect of, creating a disguised restriction on trade
between the Parties."' What remains, then, is a legal mess, with no clear
ranking of values; major conflicts will likely be tracked out to dispute
resolution for fact-specific findings.
NAFTA also privileges other standards, so-called standards-related
measures (SRMs), from challenge,7" thus authorizing the maintenance of
arguable trade distortions. SRMs, unlike SPS measures, must be
nondiscriminatory in order to resist challenge.79 As such, those SRMs which
constitute import or export restrictions are not permitted.
Where standards differ, low standards are subject to attack from above,
both as a policy matter and as undercutting political support for high standards
elsewhere, thus precipitating downward harmonization. NAFTA generally
protects low standards as well, recognizing each nation's privilege to assess
risk and make social judgments. The Environmental Side Agreement
provides, however, for various institutional mechanisms by which NAFTA
parties, as well as environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), can
exert considerable pressure on a low standard country to raise its standards.8"
Finally, the appropriate level of environmental standards is linked to
economic development;8 NAFTA may well evolve as/if Mexico grows richer
and more aggressively demands convergence while driving environmental
standards higher. There also remains the disturbing possibility that the United
States will be obliged to "purchase" higher Mexican environmental
standards.8 2
Efficiency justifications for the institutionalization of different standards
may exist within the NAFTA triad. In a way, all of North America will be
subject to Euclidean-type zoning. 3  Mexico may be "zoned" for
environmentally stressful uses that would not be permitted in the United States
and Canada. Recognizing the diverging economies, it may make sense to
77. Id art. 712(6), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
78. Id. art. 904(l), 32 I.L.M. at 387. See Wirth, supra note 49, at 831-32.
79. See Saunders, supra note 5, at 281.
80. See discussion infra note 107 and accompanying text.
81. Environmental Side Agreement, spra note 2, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. 1483.
82. See Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law, and
Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59 (1994)
(suggesting that the United States should exchange Mexican debt for environmental infrastructure
improvements).
83. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding the exclusion of
industrial establishments from residential districts). Comprehensive zoning ordinances exist in most U.S.
municipalities.
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export pollution to countries where it has a lower social cost, i.e. Mexico.
Stated so baldly, this is a discomforting notion; it plays on the sharply lowered
expectations of quality of life in Mexico and signals a diminished appreciation
of Mexican humanity.
Insisting on a common NAFTA-wide social cost floor echoes the natural
law justification for a dignified minimum wage. It is a call for renunciation
and redistribution, which are hardly popular themes in the United States at this
time."4 As a legal proposition, NAFTA has not set any particular minimum
environmental standards and may in fact permit all three NAFTA members,
should they so choose, to lower existing environmental standards. 5
IV. THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement obliges each NAFTA party
to enforce its national environmental laws,s and it creates remedies, including
intervention rights for private parties, for a nation's "persistent failure" to do
so. 87  The Environmental Side Agreement is a peculiar agreement with a
peculiar history,s" a last minute add-on to win support for NAFTA's
ratification in the United States which did not offend Mexican, Canadian, and
(not insignificantly) U.S. feelings about sovereignty.89
84. Note, congressional reaction to calls for assistance during the recent Mexican financial crisis. See
supra note 28, and accompanying text.
85. See Steve Chamovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257,
279(1994).
86. The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement calls for national enforcement of national law. This
is to be contrasted with international powers to compel enforcement of international obligations. See Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995).
87. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 14, 15, 32 I.L.M. at 1506-07. The Commission
for Environmental Cooperation has recently issued procedures for submissions by persons alleging that a
NAFTA party is failing to effectively enforce an existing environmental law. See Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS UNDER ARTICLES
14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, Oct. 17, 1995.
These procedures were held in Ottawa, Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. Joint Public Advisory
Committee, ADVICE TO COUNCIL NO. 95-5, Aug. 24, 1995.
88. See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 257-59; Raustiala, supra note 33, at 35-38.
89. See Jeffery Atik, Regional Development Assistance to Reduce Disparities Among Member
Countries: Does the EC Experience Point the Way for NAFTA?, Remarks Before the American Society of
International Law and Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht 1993 Joint Conference (July 22-
24, 1993), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT A TIME OF MOMENTOUS
CHANGE 221 (Ren6 Lefeber ed., 1994).
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The particular political and historical reasons for this emphasis on
enforcement are well-understood. During the ratification debates, Mexico
claimed its recently enacted Ecology Law was a modem, comprehensive,
environmental quality regime'-an assessment shared by the United States
government9' as well as several leading environmental organizations. On its
face, the formal Mexican legislation was substantially above criticism.'
Instead, the dismal state of the Mexican environment was attributed to a lack
of resources and an absence of political will to enforce existing Mexican law.'
Notwithstanding this special history, a broader meaning of Environmental
Side Agreement-driven enforcement may well evolve. Although each NAFTA
party will maintain its respective national environmental standards, the
remaining NAFTA parties are also "interested" in these standards. Setting
distinct national standards may indeed be an important part of the NAFTA
environmental compact. The concern for national enforcement demonstrates
the NAFTA parties' sharp interest in regulating environmental quality
throughout the larger NAFTA territory, as well as the maintenance of accorded
production gradients.' Indeed, a NAFTA party may complain about non-
enforcement by another party of an environmental standard that is higher than
its own.95
Enforcement of national environmental laws under the Environmental Side
Agreement can be understood as supporting NAFTA's goal of transparency.
Where there is a high level of environmental enforcement, each NAFTA party
knows what the "real" environmental standards are, as opposed to the book
standards. Therefore, the party can more readily assess the degree of
convergence/divergence among environmental standards and its effect among
the NAFTA parties.
90. See generally, Kublicki, supra note 82, at 82-100 (describing Mexican environmental legislation).
91. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: INFORMATION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 5-6, GAO/NSIAD-91-227 (May 1991). According
to former EPA chief William Reilly, Mexico has a set of laws that are fully equivalent to what we have in
the United States. Housman et al., supra note 61, at 594 n.3 (citing William K. Reilly, Free Trade and the
Environment: Tools for Progress, Remarks at a Meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2 (Mar. 23,
1992)).
92. But see Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 279-80 (arguing that Mexican environmental laws are
substantially more lax than U.S. laws even on the books).
93. See generally Housman et al., supra note 61, at 594.
94. Indeed, a NAFTA party may complain about non-enforcement by another party of an
environmental standard higher than its own. Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 280.
95. See id at 280. This suggests the importance of regulatory differentials.
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Transparency has long been a trade value; many of the traditional
objections to NTBs are based on the non-transparency of their effects.6
Furthermore, non-transparent measures are much more difficult to dislodge.97
Nations engaging in reciprocal bargaining are likely to overvalue the
distortionary effects of the NTBs that their producers face and to undervalue
the distortions created by their own NTBs. In the case of NAFTA, knowing
that standards will be enforced makes future benefits from raising a standard
more predictable. This, in turn, encourages the granting of concessions in
intra-NAFTA bargaining. To the extent that the United States "purchases"
future upward movement in environmental standards from Mexico, the
enforcement requirement will function to protect these "purchased" gains from
unilateral withdrawal by Mexico.
Enforcement can also be seen as a non-discrimination principle. By
insisting on strictly enforced compliance, the possibility of selective
applicability is reduced. This may be welcomed by Mexico, as well as the
United States and Canada, as a prophylactic measure against corruption of
officials. An insistence on enforcement can also be understood as preventing
distortionary discrimination between new and old investment, supporting
NAFTA's commitment to avoid pollution havens." Absent this
nondiscrimination requirement, new investment might be enticed by local
officials offering to look the other way on environmental compliance.
The comparable problem of selective enforcement might also be
anticipated with respect to mobile investments-those producers established in
Mexico which are credibly able to relocate. These firms might well use the
implicit threat attendant to their mobility to garner less stringent review,
whereas less mobile firms would be exposed to a rigorous application of the
law, or even worse, an excessive application by officials in order to average
down the aggregate effects of pollution within an area.
Real enforcement levels may be jointly adjusted by the NAFTA parties.
Should they so choose, the United States and Canada might overlook Mexican
non-enforcement during periods of crisis.99 This possibility may permit a more
continuous standard-setting by common consent.
96. JACKSON ETAL., supra note 54, at 377-78.
97. Id.
98. Article 1114(2) of NAFTA prohibits members from waiving environmental obligations in order
to attract or retain investment. NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
99. NGOs may play a watchdog role and limit some of this administrative flexibility.
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V. INSTITUTIONS FOR DIFFERENCE
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement creates the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a series of entities charged with
environmental responsibilities under the agreement."c It is not yet clear what
influence the CEC will ultimately have,'' nor whether it will lead to greater
sensitivity to environmental concerns in North America. The CEC is certainly
not a court; nor is it a legislature or regulatory oversight agency. The CEC
cannot make or enforce environmental standards, directly or indirectly. It
may, however, be an important source of influence, through which the NAFTA
parties, as well as NGOs, work out the prevailing national environmental
standards within NAFTA.'02
The CEC is charged with overseeing the national enforcement of national
environmental standards. °3 However, the CEC's own enforcement powers are
quite weak; overseeing the various national enforcers is not likely to be a
primary function of the CEC. Even if formally called upon to sanction a
100. The CEC is comprised of a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. Kevin
W. Patton, Note, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation, 5 DuKE J. COMp. & INT'L L. 87,102 (1994).
In addition to the CEC entities, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North
American Development Bank have been established by the United States and Mexico outside the NAFTA
structure. See Rowe, supra note 40, at 213-15.
Within the United States, two advisory committees have been established to advise the U.S. EPA
administrator in her role as the U.S. representative to the CEC Council. One committee includes members
of industry, NGOs, and academics; the other is comprised by state, local, and Native American officials.
NAFTA: Two Committees to Advise Administrator on North American Environmental Issues, BNA Nat'l
Env't Daily, Aug. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNANED File.
101. Charnovitz, for one, doubts whether the Environmental Side Agreement adds much to pre-
existing environmental cooperation among the NAFTA parties. Chamovitz, supra note 85, at 274-75.
102. The CEC is based in Montreal. According to its brochure, the CEC, "helps coordinate
environmental initiatives and identifies ways in which the countries of North America can work more
efficiently to protect, conserve, and enhance the environment. The CEC also can work to avoid trade and
environmental disputes." Commission for Environmental Cooperation, UNDERSTANDINGCEC. The CEC's
current work program comprises eight areas of concentration, including NAFTA Effects and Consultation
and Enforcement Issues, Environmental Laws, and Regulations. Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, 1995 PROGRAM SUMMARY. Under this last category, the Program Summary states that the
CEC, "facilitates sharing of information about criteria and methodologies which are employed by the three
NAFTA countries when establishing environmental standards. The goal is to promote greater environmental
regulatory compatability in North America through upward harmonization." Despite the use of the phrase
"upward harmonization" in the 1995 Program Summary, a CEC official related that the term
"harmonization" is not frequently used to describe CEC's work. Informal conversation with Marc Paquin,
CEC, Oct. 1995. The CEC has recently activated a Web site with current information on its activities at
http://www.cec.org.
103. See Abbott, supra note 5, at 4-9; Patton, supra note 95, at 103-09.
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NAFTA party for its alleged "persistent failure" to enforce its environmental
laws, the CEC is very unlikely to actually impose sanctions."°4 The CEC
should be expected to exercise, in its oversight role, at least as much regulatory
flexibility and discretion as practiced by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the national agency charged with primary administrative
responsibility for U.S. environmental law. 5 Like the EPA, the CEC will
likely indulge justifications premised on economic or technical hardship."r
This is not to say that the CEC's oversight does not serve a purpose; it may
restrict flagrant cases of national non-enforcement to truly justifiable cases or
circumstances.
The CEC may also be used to actively promote eventual changes in
Mexican environmental standards in response to growing wealth, advancing
technology, and a closer relationship to U.S. and Canadian standards.
Mexico's right to maintain distinct standards is certainly legitimated under
NAFTA. But NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement suggest, though
perhaps subtly, that national standards are no longer entirely national
prerogatives. While it could continue to set environmental standards which
deviate from those operating in the United States and Canada, Mexico may no
longer enjoy the pre-NAFTA freedom of action to set standards unilaterally.
Rather, Mexican national standards will be a matter of joint determination of
Mexico, the United States and Canada.
This suggests a possible role for the newly-created NAFTA environmental
institutions. Within these institutions, respective national environmental
standards may be negotiated, monitored, and adjusted by the joint action of all
parties. While these new NAFTA environmental institutions are lacking in
direct force, they may facilitate the exertion of influence on NAFTA parties
(particularly Mexico) by other NAFTA nations and by the broader
environmental community, including NGOs.' 7
104. According to Charnovitz, the Environmental Side Agreement's enforcement teeth "barely bite."
Charnovitz, supra note 81, at 269.
105. Consistent with congressional intent, the EPA has considered industry costs in enforcing U.S.
environmental laws. See Raustiala, supra note 32, at 46 (citing MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GuARDiANs? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 86-87 (1988)).
106. The Environmental Side Agreement "allows a country party to defend itself against a charge of
failing to enforce environmental laws on the grounds of inadequate resources, and since it may be assumed
that lack of resources is at the root of many enforcement failures, this broad defense might swallow the
substantive rule." Abbott, supra note 5, at 14 n.61.
107. In the Spring of 1995, the CEC launched an investigation into the death of 40,000 birds at a
reservoir in northeastern Mexico. The investigation responded to a petition filed by the National Audubon
Society and two Mexican NGOs. NAFTA: Commission Probes Bird Deaths at Contaminated Reservoir
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VI. CONCLUSION
NAFTA reflects a new form of regional order where goods and services
will circulate relatively freely, but where important categories of factors of
production are confined. Borders will still impede workers who seek
employment in other NAFTA territories; distinct labor markets will remain
entact; the movement of capital will still be subject to significant restrictions;
and each economy will largely be left to go it alone on its NAFTA-promised
road to prosperity."°s
In contrast to earlier regional integration initiatives, NAFTA and the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement legitimize important regulatory-
sourced differences in production conditions. Acute wage differentials--
artifacts of closed borders (NAFTA provides no prospect for a freedom of
movement for workers) which certainly affect the comparative cost of goods
produced--are not considered a distortion giving rise to an uneven playing
field, but are instead accepted as part of the natural order.
Consistent with this promotion of difference, the maintenance of diverging
national environmental standards is provided as a matter of right. High
environmental standards (at least within SPS and SRMs) are not to be
considered trade barriers. Countries maintaining low standards should not be
deemed environmentally irresponsible (even if the polluter doesn't always
pay) or as promoting industrial flight.
NAFTA reverses the usual regional prescription by expressly legitimating
regulatory differences. There will be different environmental standards, and
for the foreseeable future, Mexico's will generally be lower than those in the
United States and Canada. However, Mexican enforcement will be monitored
to assure that Mexican standards, an important part of the NAFTA compact,
are respected within flexible limits. New NAFTA institutions are available to
adjust future Mexican environmental standards to NAFTA's "appropriate"
in Mexico, BNA Nat'l Env't Daily, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNANED File.
In August 1995, environmental groups from the United States, Canada and Mexico petitioned the CEC
to investigate a congressionally approved increase in the level of "salvage logging" on U.S. federal lands.
Trade Pact Invoked to Block Logging Law, N. Y. TiMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al 3.
108. There is no explicit NAFTA mechanism of regional aid. See Taylor, supra note 8, at 123; Atik,
supra note 89. Rather, development assistance is haphazard, contingent, and unreliable. See Chandler,
supra note 28. After the U.S. Congress balked in providing assistance to Mexico during the peso crisis in
early 1995, President Clinton issued an emergency order placing $20 billion in U.S. reserves at Mexico's
disposition. The provision of any U.S. support was a matter of considerable doubt during the first few
weeks of the crisis. See Chandler, supra note 28.
[Vol. 3:81
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS WITHIN NAFTA 103
levels. Despite the language in NAFTA respecting sovereignty, no NAFTA
nation, and particularly not Mexico, will be able to set its environmental
standards unilaterally. Rather, national environmental standards, though not
commonly shared, will emerge from a joint determination.
NAFTA, then, is truly a new experiment in regional organization.
National authority remains, but the setting of important regulatory elements of
the production environment, such as environmental standards, are coordinated.
The end result may be a much cleaner United States, stemming from increased
U.S. wealth and the relocation of dirty industries. The fate of the Mexican
environment under NAFTA is in much greater doubt.

